Press Prudence,  Nazi Student Orders, and Jim Crow by Pollak, Louis H.
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 32 | Number 1 Article 5
2004
"Press Prudence," Nazi Student Orders, and Jim
Crow
Louis H. Pollak
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Louis H. Pollak, "Press Prudence," Nazi Student Orders, and Jim Crow, 32 Fordham Urb. L.J. 83 (2004).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol32/iss1/5
"Press Prudence," Nazi Student Orders, and Jim Crow
Cover Page Footnote
Louis Heilprin Pollak is a U.S. District Court Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. He was a member
of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund’s team of lawyers assembled by Thurgood Marshall who briefed and
argued Brown v. Board of Education. Judge Pollak served as Dean of Yale Law School from 1965-1970 and
Dean of University of Pennsylvania Law School from 1975-1978.
This article is available in Fordham Urban Law Journal: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol32/iss1/5
CHRISTENSENPOLLAK 2/3/2011 9:58 PM 
 
101 
“PRESS PRUDENCE,” NAZI STUDENT ORDERS, 
AND JIM CROW 
Louis H. Pollak*
INTRODUCTION 
 
In this year in which we in the United States take note of the fiftieth 
anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education,1 and ponder its enduring 
significance, Maria Marcus requires us to look abroad, and has made a 
significant scholarly contribution to the commemorative conversation.2  
She directs our attention to the decision of the Austrian Constitutional 
Court, in 1931, twenty-three years before Brown, declaring invalid the rules 
promulgated by the University of Vienna=s Rector and Academic Senate––
rules harmonious with the rising tide of Austrian Nazism––which 
undertook to separate the student body into four ethnically-defined 
Anations.@3  The principal purpose of the enterprise was to protect Austrian 
AGerman@ students from the risk of contact with other Austrian students 
who, notwithstanding that they might have had generations of German-
speaking ancestors, were, nonetheless, said to bear the ineradicable taint of 
a forebear or two as to whom there was no clear demonstration of baptism, 
with the result that the luckless student descendants were to be classified, 
willy-nilly, not as AGermans@ but as AJews.@4
As Professor Marcus demonstrates, the University of Vienna case is 
strikingly similar not only to Brown, but to Brown=s precursor higher 
 
 
* Louis Heilprin Pollak is a U.S. District Court Judge for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.  He was a member of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund’s team of lawyers 
assembled by Thurgood Marshall who briefed and argued Brown v. Board of Education. 
Judge Pollak served as Dean of Yale Law School from 1965-1970 and Dean of University 
of Pennsylvania Law School from 1975-1978. 
      1.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
      2.  Maria L. Marcus, Austria=s Pre-War Brown v. Board of Education, 32 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. (2004) 
      3. Marcus, supra note 2, at 1, 7-8; see Sammlung der Erkenntnisse und Wichtigsten 
Beschlüsse des Verfassungsgerichtshofes [decision of the Austrian Constitutional Court 
dated June 20, 1931 and announced on June 23, 1931] VfSlg 1397/1931, AVA-VfGH, V 
2/31-11, at 296 [hereinafter Decision]. 
      4.  See Marcus, supra note 2, at 1, 4-8. 
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education cases, most particularly McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for 
Higher Education.5  In McLaurin, the Supreme Court unanimously struck 
down, on equal protection grounds, the University of Oklahoma=s bizarre 
requirement that a black doctoral candidate sit in a Areserved for Colored@ 
row in the lecture hall, study at a separate table in the library, and eat at a 
separate table in the cafeteria.6
As Professor Marcus also observes, however, the University of Vienna 
case is, in one crucially important respect, unlike Brown and the related 
American cases striking down racial segregation in public schools and 
public universities.
   
7  The American cases invalidated legally mandated 
regimes of racial segregation that had been in force for half a century under 
the protective mantle of Plessy v. Ferguson,8 the opprobrious 1896 
Aseparate but equal@ decision (Justice Brown for the Court; Justice Harlan, 
dissenting; Justice Brewer not participating) that Brown jettisoned.9  In 
contrast, the University of Vienna case frustrated the proposed regime of 
racial separation at its inception.10  The government=s attempt in 1932 to 
secure legislation overturning the Constitutional Court=s decision of a year 
before was unsuccessful.11  And so, notwithstanding the growing strength 
of Austrian Nazism throughout the thirties, oppression of Jews by law (as 
distinct from steadily escalating personal and institutional anti-Semitism, 
including violence) was not accomplished until the Anschluss in 1938.12
I. 
  
Viewed in this light, it may be said that in 1931 the Austrian Justices did 
the job for law in Austria that in 1896 the seven-Justice Plessy majority so 
dismally failed to do for law in the United States. 
From an American perspective, an intriguing aspect of the Vienna 
University case is that, in striking contrast to Brown (and, indeed, to 
 
      5.  339 U.S. 637 (1950); see Marcus, supra note 2, at 50 (noting that although there is no 
evidence of physical segregation, the mandated separation in the University of Vienna case 
affected Jewish students= political rights which in turn affected their opportunities for 
Aintellectual commingling,@ a central concern for the McLaurin court). 
      6.  339 U.S. at 640, 642. 
      7.  Marcus, supra note 2, at 51. 
      8.  163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
      9. To be precise, Brown did not formally overrule Plessy, which had sustained a 
Louisiana statute mandating racial segregation on (intrastate) railways––Aseparate but equal@ 
cars for whites and blacks.  Rather, the Court in Brown held that Ain the field of public 
education the doctrine of >separate but equal= has no place.@  347 U.S. at 495.  A series of 
later decisions, many of them per curiam, eviscerated Aseparate but equal@ in settings other 
than public education. 
      10.  Marcus, supra note 2, at 17. 
      11.  Id. at 30. 
      12.  Id. at 23-42. 
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Plessy), the litigant challenging the separate-but-assertedly-equal Nazi 
Student Orders was not within the class of persons whose conduct was to 
be governed by the Orders.13  Ernst Klebinder was not a student, Jewish or 
otherwise.  He was the editor of the Wiener Sonn-und-Montags Zeitung, 
and he wrote and, on May 19, 1930, published in his newspaper the article 
––Seine Magnifizenz der Rektor: Der Weiner Universitaets Skandal––
which precipitated the litigation.14  The litigation was a prosecution in a 
District Criminal Court.  The presiding judge was a Justice for Press 
Affairs.  Journalist Klebinder was accused of a failure to exercise Apress 
prudence@15 in publishing an article stating that the enactment by the Rector 
and Academic Senate of the Nazi Student Orders was unlawful––a 
Ascandal.@16  As Professor Marcus points out, Klebinder=s charge that the 
Orders had no proper legal basis drew upon a legal opinion to that effect––
”Die Studenten Ordnung der Universitat Wien”17––authored by Dr. Joseph 
Hupka,18 a former Dean of Vienna Law School.19  It is noteworthy that, 
notwithstanding that Dean Hupka=s memorandum appeared in the public 
press––the Neue Freie Presse––on April 23, 1930, some three weeks 
earlier than Klebinder=s article, Professor Marcus=s narrative does not 
suggest that either Hupka or the editor of the Neue Freie Presse was 
prosecuted for failing to observe “press prudence.”20
Was Klebinder an object of selective prosecution?  Did the Viennese 
political/academic establishment regard Klebinder (perhaps because he 
used non-lawyerly words like Ascandal,@ or perhaps because his newspaper 
commanded a large and/or influential audience) with particular distaste?  
We do not know. 
 
If the prosecution of Klebinder had been characterized by the Justice for 
Press Affairs, or by the Constitutional Court, as a case addressing the scope 
of press freedom, the most analogous American case might not thought to 
be Brown v. Board of Education,21 but Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel. 
Olson.22
 
      13.  See Decision, supra note 3. 
  There, The Saturday Press, a Minneapolis newspaper which in its 
very brief career throve on causing discomfort to those in power, ran stories 
      14.  Id. 
      15.  Marcus, supra note 2, at 1. 
      16.  Decision, supra note 3. 
      17. Dr. Joseph Hupka, Die Studenten Ordnung der Universität Wien, [The Student 
Regulations of the University of Vienna] NEUE FREIE PRESSE (Vienna), April 23, 1930. 
      18.  Id. 
      19.  Marcus, supra note 2, at 2. 
      20.  Marcus, supra note 2, at 1. 
      21.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
      22.  283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
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charging that the leading political and law enforcement officials of 
Minneapolis were turning a blind eye to, or in some instances were actively 
fostering, the criminal cabals of local lawbreakers characterized as Jewish 
gangsters.23  Acting under a 1925 Minnesota statute that authorized the 
abatement as a public nuisance of any Amalicious, scandalous and 
defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical,@ a Minnesota court, at 
the instance of the Hennepin County Attorney, enjoined publisher Jay Near 
and his associates from Apublishing . . . any publication whatsoever which 
is a malicious, scandalous or defamatory newspaper . . . .@24  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court sustained the injunction.25  The United States 
Supreme Court, divided five to four, reversed.26  Chief Justice Hughes, 
writing for the majority, ruled that the state court injunction constituted a 
Aprior restraint@ barred by the First Amendment, whose constraints were 
binding on states via the Fourteenth Amendment.27  In explaining the 
importance of freedom of the press, the Chief Justice quoted at some length 
from Madison=s Report on the Virginia Resolutions.28
Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of everything, 
and in no instance is this more true than in that of the press.  It has 
accordingly been decided by the practice of the States, that it is better to 
leave a few of its noxious branches to their luxuriant growth, than, by 
pruning them away, to injure the vigour of those yielding the proper 
fruits.  And can the wisdom of this policy be doubted by any who reflect 
that to the press alone, chequered as it is with abuses, the world is 
indebted for all the triumphs which have been gained by reason and 
humanity over error and oppression; who reflect that to the same 
beneficent source the United States owe much of the lights which 
conducted them to the ranks of a free and independent nation, and which 
have improved their political system into a shape so auspicious to their 
 An excerpt from 
Madison merits requotation here: 
 
      23.  Id. at 703-05. 
     24.  Id. at 706. 
     25.  State ex rel. Olson v. Guilford, 228 N.W. 326 (Minn. 1929). 
     26.  Near, 283 U.S. 697. 
     27.  Id. at 713-14.  In 1931, when Near v. Minnesota was decided, the principle that the 
Fourteenth Amendment=s Aliberty@ encompassed the First Amendment=s free press and free 
speech guarantees was a relatively new doctrine, commencing six years before, in Gitlow v. 
New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1927), as a proposition to be assumed arguendo.  In Near, Chief 
Justice Hughes cited Gitlow, Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), Fiske v. Kansas, 
274 U.S. 380 (1927), and Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), in support of the 
pronouncement that A[i]t is no longer open to doubt that the liberty of the press and of 
speech is within the liberty safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment from invasion by state action.@  283 U.S. at 707. 
     28.  Near, 283 U.S. at 718. 
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happiness?29
Madison=s pragmatic exposition, endorsed by Chief Justice Hughes, of why 
it makes good sense to refrain from cutting away Anoxious branches,@ has 
within it the seeds of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
 
30
Jay Near=s Saturday Press may well have been a Anoxious branch.@
 which was three 
decades in the future. 
31
II. 
  By 
contrast, Ernst Klebinder=s newspaper would appear to have been one Aof 
those yielding the proper fruits.@  The Supreme Court=s decision in Near v. 
Minnesota was announced on June 1, 1931, while the Constitutional 
Court=s decision in the University of Vienna case was announced on June 
23, 1931.  There is little reason to suppose that any justice sitting on either 
court was, in the summer of 1931, aware of the other court=s decision. 
But of course neither the Justice for Press Affairs nor the Constitutional 
Court treated the prosecution of Ernst Klebinder as a freedom of the press 
case.  The Justice for Press Affairs evidently saw the question of whether 
Klebinder had observed Apress prudence@ as turning on the correctness vel 
non of Klebinder=s contention that the Nazi Student Orders were not 
permitted by Austrian law.32  Addressing that question, the Justice for Press 
Affairs concluded, after an evidentiary hearing, that the Orders were 
doubly flawed: (1) The student Anations@ contemplated by the Orders were 
Aassociations@ which, under Austria=s closely woven associations statutes, 
the Academic Senate, not being a governmental legislative body, lacked 
authority to establish.33 (2) Assuming arguendo that the Academic Senate 
did have authority to establish entities of this sort, the Anations@  
transgressed constitutional principles of equality34
 
     29.  Id. (quoting Report on the Virginia Resolutions, Madison’s Works, vol. iv, 544). 
 because their defining 
     30.  376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
     31.  That certainly was the view of Justice Butler and the three Justices––Van Devanter, 
McReynolds, and Sutherland––who joined in his dissent: AThe record shows, and it is 
conceded, that defendants= regular business was the publication of malicious, scandalous, 
and defamatory articles concerning the principal public officers= leading newspapers of the 
city, many private persons, and the Jewish race.@  283 U.S. at 724.  But from another 
perspective the Saturday Press has been perceived to be a Areformist newspaper.@  Ralph 
Frasca, The Helderberg Advocate: A Public-Nuisance Prosecution a Century Before Near v. 
Minnesota, 26 J.  SUP. CT. HIST. 215 (2001). 
     32.  Marcus, supra note 2, at 8. 
     33.  Id. at 9. 
     34. See id. at 11.  According to Professor Marcus, under the Austrian Constitution of 
1929, A[a]ll Austrian nationals were equal before the law, enjoying the same rights without 
distinction as to language, religion, or race.  The Constitution guaranteed that differences in 
religion >shall not prejudice any Austrian national in the exercise of civil rights,= and that 
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characteristic was Athe principle of ethnic origin rather than the principle of 
citizenship.@35 The Justices of the Constitutional Court were able to agree 
with the Justice for Press Affairs that the Academic Senate had no authority 
to create what were perceived to be Aassociations,@ and for that reason the 
Nazi Student Orders were rescinded––and in consequence, the charges 
against Klebinder were dismissed.36  But, as Professor Marcus shows with 
penetrating precision, the Justices were not able either to accept, or flatly to 
reject, the alternative ruling––the ruling of constitutional dimension––
proposed by the Justice for Press Affairs.37  What the Justices were able to 
do, after extended debate, was to agree that dividing a university=s student 
body Aaccording to specified common points of view@ would be 
unobjectionable Aif . . . [this] classification . . . accords with constitutional 
principles@38––a proviso crafted by Justice Arthur Lenhoff (a professor at 
Vienna Law School) at an earlier stage of the debate to trammel a proposal 
by Justice Ludwig Adamovich (a professor at Graz) that Aethnic origin@ be 
affirmatively recognized by the Court as a permissible Acommon point of 
view.@39 As the Justices= debate went on, Aethnic origin@ was disapproved, 
to be replaced by Anationality@ as a potentially acceptable “common point 
of view”––but still subject to the delphic “if . . . [this] classification accords 
with constitutional principles.”40
From the perspective of an American lawyer, it may seem odd that a 
court which had quickly agreed upon a statutory ground on which the case 
was to be decided would then labor on to opine upon constitutional issues.  
Avoidance of unnecessary constitutional opining about legislative or 
executive conduct, actual or potential, is a hallmark of American judicial 
review as that authority has been exercised by Article III courts ever since 
Marbury v. Madison.
 
41
 
Austrians who belonged to racial, religious, or other minorities >shall enjoy the same 
treatment and security in law and in fact as the other Austrian nationals.=@  Id.   
  Viewed as an aspect of the federal judiciary=s 
     35.  Id. at 8-9. 
     36.  See id. at 9, 12-13. 
     37.  See id. at 10, 14-17. 
     38.  Id. at 16. 
     39.  Id. at 15-16. 
     40. Id. at 16.  Professor Marcus notes, with respect to the dropping of Aethnic origin@ in 
favor of Anationality,@ that “[i]t is significant that this term [>nationality=] could fit an 
Austrian citizen who happened to be Jewish in a way that >ethnic origin= might not.  For 
example, the Saint-Germain Treaty stated that Austrian nationals belonging to religious or 
racial minorities must receive the same treatment >as the other Austrian nationals.=“  Id. at 
17. 
     41.  5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).  Marbury, however, is open to the criticism that the 
Court did some unnecessary constitutional opining.  A closer reading of Section 13 of the 
1789 Judiciary Act could have led the Court to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on statutory 
grounds without reaching issues of constitutional dimension. 
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incapacity to render advisory opinions, such avoidance has jurisdictional 
status.  But avoidance of advisory opinions is an element of judicial 
restraint that bulks even larger than the formalities, vital as they are, of 
jurisdiction.  It is an ingredient of adjudication that goes to the separation 
of powers.  To tell another entity of government what it may or may not do 
in advance of a Acase@ or Acontroversy@ requiring judicial resolution is to 
intrude upon that entity=s coequal independence (or, if the entity is a state, 
that state=s sovereignty). 
But an explanation for the Austrian Constitutional Court=s mode of 
adjudication suggests itself: The readiness of Austrian judges to venture 
into constitutional waters (and very tricky waters at that) where most 
American judges would have remained safely on the beach may, 
paradoxically, flow from the very fact that decisions of the Austrian 
Constitutional Court were not expected to have controlling future authority.  
As Professor Marcus observes: “The Justices were operating under a 
Roman-law-based civil code, a statutory system with little space for 
customary law and no recognition of judge-made law as formal precedent 
for future cases and parties.”42
Although the Austrian Justices opined when it was unnecessary to do so, 
what they actually said was at once narrow and obscure.  The Court could 
not announce larger, or clearer, principles because the Justices were, in 
Professor Marcus=s splendid phrase, A[t]rapped in the tradition of 
unanimity@
 
43––so all they could do, following argument, was confer for 
two days, arrive at a few opaque lowest common denominators, and 
announce their decision.44
 
      42.  Marcus, supra note 2, at 21. 
 The importance of the Constitutional Court=s 
decision was twofold: First: The Court blocked the Nazi Student Orders.  
Second: To the extent that the Court ventured into the Austrian 
Constitution, the Court, in the face of very grave pressures, and due 
primarily to the expert defensive lawyering of Justice Lenhoff, did no clear 
damage to the Constitution=s equality principles. 
      43.  Id. at 17. 
      44. The chronology was as follows: The Court heard argument on June 18, 1931; 
conferred on June 19 and June 20; wrote its opinion deciding the case on June 20; and 
announced its decision on June 23.  See Decision, supra note 3.  (June 20 was a Saturday, 
and one presumes that the Court then delayed public announcement of the decision until 
after the weekend; but just why the Court did not announce the decision on Monday, June 
22, is not immediately apparent––unless June 22 was a holiday).  See id. 
  Deciding big cases with this celerity has not been a characteristic of American 
constitutional adjudication.  A notable recent exception was Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 
(2000). 
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III. 
The University of Vienna litigation had two heroes:45
One was Joseph Hupka, the former Dean of Vienna Law School who did 
the initial, courageous, lawyerly job of demonstrating that the Nazi Student 
Orders were unlawful.  Tragically, as Professor Marcus reports, following 
the Anschluss Dean Hupka was to die in a concentration camp.
 
46 As we 
honor Dean Hupka we may also honor another dean, Charles Hamilton 
Houston of Howard Law School, who in the early thirties laid the 
groundwork for the campaign (in which he enlisted two younger 
colleagues: William H. Hastie and Thurgood Marshall) that ultimately was 
to bear fruit in Brown v. Board of Education.47
The other hero of the University of Vienna litigation was Arthur 
Lenhoff.  The professor/judge did important service in piloting his fellow 
Justices to a proper conclusion.  Happily, Arthur Lenhoff and his wife and 
daughter were able to escape from Austria at the time of the Anschluss.  
The Lenhoffs came to the United States, where he soon was appointed to 
the law faculty of the University of Buffalo.  As Professor Saul, a Buffalo 
colleague of Arthur Lenhoff=s, wrote in a memorial tribute, A[w]hat this 
country did in receiving Dr. Lenhoff, and the [other refugee scholars] was 
in a sense repaid by what he, and they, contributed to intellectual and 
scholarly life here.@
 
48  Professor Clyde Summers, the dean of American 
labor law scholars, who was also a Buffalo colleague of Lenhoff=s, notes 
that Lenhoff made labor law one of his principal areas of expertise and, in 
particular, that his friend was the first American academic to undertake 
serious comparative scholarship in labor law.49
CONCLUSION 
  It is a good thing for 
American law that Arthur Lenhoff=s daughter has followed in her father=s 
scholarly footsteps.  Professor/Justice Lenhoff would have reason to be 
very gratified that Professor Marcus has dedicated her fine article to him. 
In 1931, the Austrian Constitutional Court declined to give the Austrian 
Constitution=s imprimatur to the version of Aseparate but equal@ promoted 
 
      45.  Perhaps Ernst Klebinder merits hero status, but this writer lacks information about 
him other than the fact that he wrote a newspaper story that got him in trouble but was 
rescued by the Austrian courts. 
      46.  Marcus, supra note 2, at 41-42. 
      47.  347 U.S. 483 (1954).  Sadly, Dean Houston did not live to see the Promised Land.  
He died in 1950, four years before Brown v. Board of Education. 
      48.  Saul Touster, Arthur Lenhoff, ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCHS., 1965 Proceedings Pt. 1-10, 
at 144. 
      49.  Telephone Interview with Clyde Summers (Aug. 23, 2004). 
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by Austrian Nazis, and thereby helped to hold at bay for seven years, until 
the Anschluss, the translation of Nazi race doctrine into law.  In 1954, the 
United States Supreme Court stripped from the United States Constitution 
the Jim Crow version of Aseparate but equal,@ thereby reinstating America=s 
promise of democracy. 
AIt may truly be said@ that the judiciary has Aneither FORCE nor WILL, 
but merely judgment.@50
 
  Nonetheless, it has authority.  
 
      50.  THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
